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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GENRICH YANOVSKY and 
RAISA YANOVSKY, his wife, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents 
vs. 
ALLISON L. NOWELS and 
ELEANOR S. NOWELS, his wife, 
Defendants/Appellants 
RESPONDENTS1 BRIEF 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter 
pursuant to the provisions of §78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, (1987 supp.) and Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment entered by the trial 
court against Appellants in a declaratory judgment action brought 
by the Respondents wherein they sought judicial determination of 
the rights of the parties under an agreement executed by the 
parties on September 5, 1985. 
Case No. 880232-CA 
Priority No. 14b 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court committed a reversible 
error in interpreting the agreement entered into by the parties 
on September 5, 1985, 
2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error 
when it ruled that the principal obligation, secured by a Trust 
Deed Note, was reduced by $30,000.00 when Respondents made a 
balloon payment to Appellants pursuant to the September, 1985, 
agreement and that Respondents1 obligation to pay interest will 
be only on the unpaid balance after the reduction of $30,000.00 
on the principal as of September 5, 1985. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about February 3, 1982, the Respondents purchased 
certain real property located at 1230 East Breckenridge Drive, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, from Appellants.(R. 6-8) On that date 
Respondents also executed a Trust Deed Note whereby they promised 
to pay to Appellants the sum of $55,700.00 as payment for said 
property. (R. 7) This sum was to be paid in monthly installments 
of $489.00 per month beginning on April 1, 1982, and ending on 
October 1, 1989. On October 1, 1989, the entire balance, 
including accrued interest will be due and payable by 
Respondents. The Trust Deed Note further provides for a balloon 
payment of $30,000.00 which was to be paid on March 1, 1987.(R.7) 
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In September, 1985, Appellants, in need of money, 
approached Respondents to propose an earlier payment date of the 
$30,000.00 balloon payment. In consideration for the early 
payment, Appellants offered to reduce the payment from $30,000.00 
to $25,000.00.(R.12) 
On September 5, 1985, Appellants prepared an agreement 
memorializing the parties1 understanding. That agreement 
provided as follows: 
"WHEREAS, Genrich Yanovsky and Raisa Yanovsky owe 
a payment of $30,000.00 on the second trust deed 
dated February 3, 1982, to Allison L. Nowels and 
Eleanor S. Nowels, on March 1, 1987, the Yanovskys 
agree to pay the Nowels $25,000.00 on September 5, 
1985, in consideration for a $5,000.00 reduction 
of the $30,000.00 payment due March 1, 1987. 
It is further agreed by both parties to the 
original contract that the payment schedule 
starting with payment number 041 due September 1, 
1985, will remain in force exactly as originally 
written with no further changes or exceptions.ff 
R.12) [Emphasis added] 
Subsequent to the execution of the September 5, 1985, 
agreement, a dispute arose between the parties concerning the 
application of the balloon payment and monthly payments toward 
interest and the principal balance. On April 30, 1986, 
Respondents filed the underlying action seeking judicial 
determination of the parties1 rights and obligations pursuant to 
the Trust Deed Note of February 3, 1982, and the September 5, 
1985, agreement.(R.2-5) 
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Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with the 
trial court. (R.45-46) That court, after considering the 
arguments of the parties and the evidence submitted by the 
parties, entered an Order and Judgment on December 4, 1987. 
(R.108-110) By entering that order and judgment, the trial court 
ruled that Respondents' payment of $25,000.00 reduced the 
principal amount owing to Appellants by $30,000.00 as of 
September 5, 1985. The trial court further ruled that 
Respondents1 obligation- to pay interest will be only on the 
unpaid principal, after the reduction as of September 5, 1985. 
(R.110) 
Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on January 4, 
1988. (R. 113-114) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The parties in this case do not significantly disagree 
on the applicable law, nor is there a significant disagreement of 
facts. In this case, Respondents executed a Trust Deed Note 
wherein they agreed, among other things, to pay Appellants a 
$30,000.00 balloon payment. That payment was payable on March 1, 
1987. In September, 1985, Appellants approached Respondents to 
request an earlier payment date. In consideration for such 
earlier payment, Appellants offered to reduce the balloon payment 
from $30,000.00 to $25,000.00. 
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On September 5, 1985, the parties memorialized their 
verbal agreement by executing a written agreement prepared by 
Appellants. This written agreement also reflected the parties' 
intent to abide by their original "payment schedule". Appellants 
have taken the position that "payment schedule" actually means 
"amortization schedule". The net result of Appellants1 position 
is that Respondents would continue to make payments, both 
interest and principal, as though no lump sum payment had been 
made by Respondents. This is not, however, what the parties had 
agreed upon. Why would Respondents agree to pay Appellants 
$25,000.00 unless they received credit for the payment? 
The "United States Rule" requires that the payment made 
by Respondents is to be applied toward reducing the interest due. 
If that payment exceeds the interest, the surplus goes toward 
reducing the principal, with subsequent interest to be computed 
on the balance of the principal remaining due. 
This Court, just as the trial court did, must apply the 
"United States Rule". Unless this Court applies that rule and 
affirms the trial court's Order and Judgment, the clear and 
obvious intent of the parties, expressed in their September 5, 
1985, agreement, will be defeated. The express intent was that 
by making an early payment Respondents would receive a $5,000.00 
reduction in their obligation. Appellants are asking this Court 
to take away that deduction. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPLICATION ON THE "UNITED STATES RULE" 
REQUIRES THAT PAYMENTS SHOULD FIRST BE APPLIED TO 
INTEREST DUE. 
In the absence of an agreement or statutes the "United 
States Rule" is applied to cases involving partial payment of an 
interest-bearing debt. This rule provides: 
"the payment should be first applied to the 
interest. If the payment exceeds the interest, 
the surplus * goes towards discharging the 
principal, and the subsequent interest is to be 
compounded on the balance of the principal 
remaining due." 45 AmJur 2d. Interest and Usery, 
Section 99, pages 88-89, 
Though there appear to be no Utah cases which have 
applied the "United States Rule", several sister states have 
applied it. Wortman v. Sun Oil Company, 690 P.2d 385, 391 (Kan. 
1984). City and County of Honolulu v. Kam, 402 P.2d 683, 693 
(Haw, 1965). 
Applying the "United States Rule" to the instant case, 
the payment made by Respondents on September 5, 1985, must first 
be applied to the interest due. If that payment exceeds the 
interest due, the surplus must be applied toward reducing the 
principal. Subsequent interest must then be computed on the 
balance of the interest due. This is what the trial court ruled. 
Appellants have insisted that the interest payment, as 
set forth in the amortization schedule, must be continued without 
giving Respondents credit for the payment made on September 5, 
1985. If Appellants are allowed to do this, then Respondents 
will not receive a $5,000.00 reduction, but will, at best, 
receive a nominal benefit. This is not what the parties 
intended. The parties clearly intended that Respondents receive 
a $5,000.00 reduction in their debt. To further this intent this 
Court must affirm the trial court's order* 
POINT II 
CONTRACTS ARE' TO BE CONSTRUED IN LIGHT OF THE 
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF THE PARTIES AS 
EVIDENCED BY THE PURPOSE AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE 
CONTRACT. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a contract is "to 
be construed in light of reasonable expectations of the parties 
as evidenced by the purpose and language of the contract.11 Nixon 
and Nixon, Inc. v. John New & Associates, 641 P.2d 144, 146 
(Utah 1982). Dubois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823 (Utah 1978). 
The expectations or intent of the parties is to be 
ascertained from the content of the contract. Utah Valley Bank 
v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061 (Utah 1981); Stranger v. Sentinel 
Security Life Insurance Company, 669 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1983). 
In the instant case, Appellants approached Respondents 
about prepaying the $30,000.00 due on March 1, 1987. In 
consideration for such prepayment, Appellants agreed to a 
reduction of Respondents1 obligation by $5,000.00. The clear 
intent and expectations of the parties was quite obvious: 
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Appellants received a $25,000.00 payment a year and a half before 
such payment was due, and Respondents were to receive a $5,000.00 
reduction in their obligation. 
Appellants, after receiving their payment, refused to 
honor the agreement by continuing to hold Respondents to the same 
amortization schedule. Stated more simply, Appellants attempted 
to continue collecting the interest as though Respondents had not 
made the $25,000.00 payment. 
The parties continued, as agreed, to abide by the 
"payment schedule11. Appellants insisted, however, that the 
reference to the "payment schedule" in their September 25, 1985, 
agreement is a reference to the "amortization schedule". 
To accomplish what the parties obviously intended and 
expected, this Court must affirm what the trial court found and 
hold that Appellants cannot collect interest on the obligation 
without giving credit for the payment made by Respondents on 
September 5, 1985. 
CONCLUSION 
Absent any agreement or statute to the contrary, this 
court must apply the "United States Rule". The application of 
this rule requires that the payment made by the Respondents on 
September 5, 1985, must first be applied to interest due and the 
surplus will be used to reduce the principal. 
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To allow Appellants to collect interest as though 
Respondents had not made the September 5, 1985, payment would 
defeat the clear intent and expectations of the parties when they 
entered into the September 5, 1985, agreement. Accepting 
Appellants1 position, that they are allowed to collect interest 
as though Respondents did not make the payment on September 5, 
1985, destroys the consideration for which Respondents bargained 
and defeats what the parties intended. 
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted 
that this Court must affirm the trial court's Order and Judgment. 
Dated this r C day of June, 1988. 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, DIBB & JACKSON 
Thomas A. Duffin 
Attorney for Respondents 
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